Legal Winners and Losers In The Mortgage Crisis by Martin, Shaun P
University of Connecticut 
OpenCommons@UConn 
Connecticut Insurance Law Journal School of Law 
2018 
Legal Winners and Losers In The Mortgage Crisis 
Shaun P. Martin 
Follow this and additional works at: https://opencommons.uconn.edu/cilj 
 Part of the Insurance Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Martin, Shaun P., "Legal Winners and Losers In The Mortgage Crisis" (2018). Connecticut Insurance Law 
Journal. 13. 
https://opencommons.uconn.edu/cilj/13 
LEGAL WINNERS AND LOSERS
IN THE MORTGAGE CRISIS
SHAUN P. MARTIN
I. INTRODUCTION
Trillions of dollars were lost when the mortgage and housing 
bubble burst in the late 2000s. Some of those losses fell squarely on lenders 
who otherwise had made good loans. But billions of dollars were also lost 
as a result of mortgage fraud, often the result of borrowers who allegedly 
made material misstatements on their loan applications. Not surprisingly, 
after the meltdown, banks and others sought to recoup those losses through 
civil and ancillary criminal proceedings against these borrowers. Courts 
have generally been sympathetic to such efforts. Borrowers adjudged guilty 
of mortgage fraud are often ordered to pay millions of dollars in criminal 
restitution payments to the banks to which they submitted fraudulent 
mortgage applications.
However, these restitution orders are not only typically 
unwarranted, but reward active participants in fraudulent conduct who have 
already handsomely profited from the underlying fraud. Given the presence 
of widespread mortgage securitization during the relevant period, lenders 
rarely lost money from even blatantly fraudulent mortgages. Instead, these 
lenders originated the underlying mortgages and promptly sold them to 
other market participants. Some downstream purchasers lost money when 
the housing market collapsed and the fraudulent mortgages went unpaid; 
but the restitution orders entered by courts invariably fail to direct 
restitution payments to the actual losers. Instead, such orders improperly 
award restitution to lenders who made – rather than lost – money from the 
fraud.
This Article explores the pervasive securitization of mortgages 
during the relevant period and argues that in light of this practice, courts 
should not award civil or criminal restitution absent evidentiary proof of 
direct losses by the actual lender itself. In the overwhelming majority of 
cases, no such evidence exists.
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II. DIRECT MORTGAGE LENDING: HISTORY AND 
INCENTIVES
The traditional view of the mortgage industry is a simple one.  It is 
also one that resonates with the lay public, since it accurately characterizes 
a portion of the way in which banks make some of their loans.
In this model, banks make loans to borrowers and then retain these 
loans (and the repayment thereof) as a means of making money.1 There 
may be intermediaries in such settings; for example, a particular company 
that “services” the loan by performing the day-to-day function of 
communicating with the borrower and making sure payments are made on 
time and to the correct entity. However, in the end the lender is the entity 
that makes the loan, and the borrower’s repayments of that loan are given 
to the lender. 
When the bank is a direct lender, as the mortgage originator, it 
traditionally has substantial incentives to be diligent in the information it
obtains, verifies, and relies upon in deciding which mortgages it funds.2
Those incentives exist because the bank, as a direct lender, incurs the losses 
resulting from any fraud.3 In the traditional mortgage transaction, a bank 
obtains capital from depositors (e.g., its customers), directly lends funds to 
residential borrowers, is the beneficial holder of the resulting mortgages on 
the properties, and profits when these mortgages are repaid (or loses money
——————————————————————————————
1 See generally Janet Berry-Johnson, How Does a Mortgage Work?,
LENDINGTREE (Nov. 12, 2017), https://www.lendingtree.com/home/mortg
age/how-does-a-mortgage-work/.
2 See generally FDIC Law, Regulations, Related Acts, FDIC (April 20, 
2014), https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/5000-5150.html.
3 See generally Ben Hallman, Bank of America Mortgage Fraud: Feds 
Sue For Over $1 Billion Alleging Multi-Year Scheme, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Oct. 25, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/24/bank-of-
america-mortgage fraud_n_2009791.html.
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if the borrowers default).4 This traditional structure generally gave banks 
substantial reason to ask relevant inquiries of potential borrowers and to 
confirm the truth of those answers, as the financial consequences of an 
unpaid mortgage would fall directly on the bank.5
It nonetheless bears mention that a lender’s economic self-interest 
in diligently seeking and verifying relevant information was somewhat 
diminished even in this traditional mortgage setting during periods in 
which home prices consistently increased.6 Traditional incentives waned
because lenders typically expected to make money even on those loans that 
were obtained based on applications that contained factual misstatements.  
The factual misstatements did not negatively impact the lenders, due in part 
to the appreciation in the value of the home during the period between the 
issuance of the mortgage and the subsequent sale (and/or repossession) of 
the property.7 For example, if a home buyer overstated his income on a 
mortgage application in order to qualify for the purchase of a $300,000 
property in 2005 and was subsequently unable to make his required 
mortgage payments in 2006, the direct lender would still profit on this loan 
because the home, when repossessed or refinanced in 2006, was worth 
$350,000 as a result of appreciation in the overall housing market.  A
lender in such an economic environment would not suffer adverse 
consequences as a result of the misstatements in the application since the 
resulting increased equity in the home would be sufficient to repay the 
mortgage. In fact, direct lenders often made substantial additional profits in 
——————————————————————————————
4 See Navid Vazire, Smoke and Mirrors: Predatory Lending and the 
Subprime Mortgage Loan Securitization Pyramid Scheme, 30 PACE L. REV.
41, 47 (2009).
5 Id.
6 Jann Swanson, Market Shifts May Lead to More Mortgage 
Fraud, MORTGAGE NEWS DAILY (Mar. 1, 2017), http://www.mortgagenewsdaily.
com/03012017_mortgage_fraud.asp.
7See generally Annika Mengisen, Straight From the Foreclosure
Expert's Mouth, FREAKONOMICS (May 1, 2009, 10:09 AM), http://freakono
mics.com/2009/05/01/power-question/.
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such settings as a result of late fees and other charges associated with the 
failure to pay and/or refinancing of the mortgage.8
In short, during an era in which home prices were appreciating or 
expected to appreciate, all lenders in the mortgage industry – even those 
who retained their own loans – profited from loans that were funded based 
on radically inaccurate loan application statements.9 This expectation of 
profit dramatically affected the standards applied by those lenders in 
deciding which statements in a loan application were material. When 
lenders expected that housing prices would appreciate, the specific 
information in any particular loan application would not solely affect their 
rationale for lending. Rather, their decisions were based on market 
conditions. It was that anticipated appreciation – not anything in the loan 
application itself, nor information about the borrower – that swayed lenders 
throughout the industry in deciding whether to fund any particular 
mortgage.10
The first half-decade of the twenty-first century was an 
appreciating market.11 From 2000 to 2006 home prices rose dramatically
and consistently before leveling out and abruptly declining in 2008.12 Even 
when expressed in nominal terms – and, to be clear, lenders in this industry
cared only about actual values, not inflation-adjusted values – even 
subprime lenders during this period saw ever-increasing home prices as a 
substantial bulwark against losses from even fraudulently obtained 
——————————————————————————————
8 Jane Quinn, Foreclosure Fraud: How You Can Be Driven to Default 
Even If You Pay On Time, CBS NEWS MONEYWATCH (Oct. 13, 2010, 2:06 
PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/foreclosure-fraud-how-you-can-be-
driven-to-default-even-if-you-pay-on-time/.
9 Id.
10 See generally Ronald Utt, The Subprime Mortgage Market Collapse: 
A Primer on the Causes and Possible Solutions, THE HERITAGE 
FOUNDATION (Apr. 22, 2008), http://www.heritage.org/report/the-subprime
-mortgage-market-collapse-primer-the-causes-and-possible-solutions.
11 See Raymond Lombra, The Rise and Fall of the U.S. Housing 
Market Past, Present, and Future, JUNIOR ACHIEVEMENT, 3,https://ww
w.juniorachievement.org/documents/20009/36541/Housing-Market-paper.p
df/63e03a3a-9561-4532-be0a-4311141ddb67.
12 Id.
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mortgages.13 The dominant market appreciation, as well as the subsequent 
crash in housing prices, is evident from the following chart: 
This price appreciation was even more pronounced (and
anticipated) in particular mortgage markets.14 For example, between the 
fourth quarter of 2003 and the fourth quarter of 2004, the median sales 
price for a home in the Sacramento, California area increased a whopping 
31.5%, and several other metropolitan areas saw even larger year-on-year 
appreciation.15 Traditional mortgage loans made and held by direct lenders 
created a facial incentive to avoid (or at least not actively participate) in 
——————————————————————————————
13 See William N. Goetzmann, Liang Peng & Jacqueline Yen, The
Subprime Crisis and House Price Appreciation, 44 J. REAL EST. & FIN.
ECON. 33, 57, 60 (2012).
14 See PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE OF CALIFORNIA, THE CALIFORNIA 
ECONOMY:CRISIS IN THE HOUSING MARKET (2008), http://www.ppic.org/content/p
ubs/jtf/JTF_HousingMarketJTF.pdf.
15 See Sara Max, Hot Housing Markets, CNNMONEY (Feb. 15 2005 11:40 AM 
EST), http://money.cnn.com/2005/02/15/real_estate/metromarkets/.
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mortgage fraud, but even those incentives were generally overwhelmed by 
anticipated market appreciation.16
III. THE RISE OF SECURITIZATION
Direct residential lending was the dominant norm for most of our 
nation’s history, with individual banks directly making loans to individual 
borrowers and the banks themselves holding the resulting mortgages for 
repayment.17 The United States experimented with two brief departures 
from this precedent before the 1980s with both episodes ending badly.18
In the late 1800s, due to insufficient capital in local rural banks and 
a desire to geographically diversify, farm mortgages were sometimes 
financed through a process called “mortgage brokerage,” in which western 
borrowers were connected with northeastern and European investors 
through mortgage brokers in rural areas.19 The investors who purchased 
these farm mortgages reviewed and could accept or reject each individual 
loan. As a result, there was substantial (albeit imperfect) quality control.20
Ultimately, the rural mortgage brokerage industry collapsed after many of 
the western mortgage companies were devastated by financial crises in the 
1890s, and traditional mortgage lending returned to the rural west.21
Quasi-securitization of private mortgages briefly returned in the 
1910s and 1920s, this time in cities. Here, northeastern title insurance
——————————————————————————————
16 See Neil Fligstein & Alexander Roehrkasse, Dep’t. Soc. U.C. Berkeley, All 
the Incentives Were Wrong: Opportunism and the Financial Crisis at 18, Address 
at Yale Law School: Law and Ethics Conference (Feb. 15-16, 2013).
17 See generally Michele Lerner, The mortgage market is now 
dominated by non-bank lenders, THE WASHINGTON POST, (Feb. 23, 
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/realestate/the-mortgage-market-is
-now-dominated-by-nonbank-lenders/2017/02/22/9c6bf5fc-d1f5-11e6-a783
-cd3fa950f2fd_story.html?utm_term=.afe87c5136a8.
18 See Michael Simkovic, Competition and Crisis in Mortgage 
Securitization, 88 IND. L. J. 213, 217 (2013).
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 218.
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companies insured private mortgages, pooled them into trusts, and sold 
investors “participation certificates” backed by these insured mortgage 
pools.22 The inadequate capitalization of the insurance companies, 
combined with endemic fraud, engendered the collapse of this fledgling 
market as well.23
As a result, direct bank lending again became the unchallenged 
norm. This was especially the case once the federal government began 
insuring mortgages through programs sponsored by the Federal Housing 
Administration (“FHA”) (established in 1934), the Department of Veterans 
Affairs (“VA”) (established in 1944), and the Farmers Home 
Administration (“FmHA”) (established in 1946). This custom was further 
normalized once the Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie 
Mae”) began buying mortgages in 1938.24
In the 1980s, however, large-scale private mortgage securitization 
reemerged; this time becoming the overwhelmingly dominant means 
through which banks allocated default risks.25 Significantly, and relatedly, 
this allocation of default risk radically altered which statements in a 
mortgage application would be material to lenders in that industry; i.e., 
which statements the lenders would actually (or even tend to) rely upon in 
deciding whether to fund any particular mortgage.26
——————————————————————————————
22 See generally Housing Finance Reform: Should There Be a 
Government Guarantee? Hearing Before the Comm. on Banking, Housing, 
and Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 54-55 (2011).
23 Id.
24 See Michael Simkovic, Competition and Crisis in Mortgage 
Securitization, 88 Ind. L.J. 213 (2013).
25 Id. at 24; see also Neil Fligstein & Adam Goldstein, The 
Transformation of Mortgage Finance and the Industrial Roots of the
Mortgage Meltdown, UC BERKELEY WORKING PAPER SERIES (Oct. 
2012), https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2zx8r7fb.
26 See Elena Carletti, Competition and Regulation in Banking, in HANDBOOK OF 
FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION AND BANKING 441, 450–51 (Anjan V. Thakor &
Arnoud W. A. Boot eds., 2008) (noting that an increase in the number of competitors 
undermines bank screening tests for borrower creditworthiness).
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In its most basic form, mortgage securitization involves selling a 
bundle of loans, or specific pieces of that bundle to outside investors.27
When mortgages are securitized, the bank that originated the mortgage no 
longer loses money if the homeowner defaults on the mortgage. Instead,
only the outside investors (or some of them) bear the burden of this 
default.28 In contrast, the bank that initially funded the mortgage has 
already sold its interest in the loan at a profit, and is not injured by the
subsequent default.
The process of mortgage securitization involves four steps.29 First, 
an institution – typically a bank – “originates” a loan by making a mortgage 
to an individual homeowner.30 Second, either the originating institution or a 
different entity “services” the mortgage by collecting and recording
payments made by the borrower.31 Third, another financial entity creates a 
“securitization” package by buying large numbers of individual loans from 
originators and then packages these loans into products that can be sold to 
outside investors.32 Finally, individual investors and institutions (e.g., 
money market mutual funds and pension funds) purchase these securitized 
loans – generally called “mortgage backed securities” (“MBS”) – from 
securitizers and stand to gain or lose money depending on whether specific 
portions of the securitized loans are eventually repaid by the borrowers.33
Starting in the 1980s, but particularly in the 1990s and thereafter, 
participants in the mortgage origination industry began to recognize that 
they could exponentially increase their profits were they to securitize the 
——————————————————————————————
27 See Simkovic, supra note 24, at 214.
28 See generally Edward L. Glaeser, Debating the Securitization of 
Mortgages, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2010, https://economix.blogs.nytimes.co
m/2010/07/27/debating-the-securitization-of-mortgages.
29 See generally The Department of the Treasury Blueprint for a Modernized 
Financial Regulatory Structure (March 2008) https://www.treasury.gov/press-
center/press-releases/Documents/Blueprint.pdf.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
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mortgages they made rather than holding them.34 Three attributes of the 
securitization process facilitated the availability of these increased 
revenues.
First, originators discovered that outside investors would pay more 
for privately originated loans than the expected value of those loans to the 
originator. Sometimes outside investors had lower costs of capital, or lesser 
regulatory burdens than the originating banks.35 Other times outside 
investors could diversify better than a regional (or even national) bank.36
Outside investors were also often willing to pay more for a package of 
loans than what that package was objectively (at least to the originator) 
worth.37 With outside investors willing to pay more for mortgages than 
banks thought they were worth, banks quickly discovered that there was 
money to be made by securitizing these loans.38
Second, originating banks and more sophisticated financial 
institutions (e.g., brokers) quickly discovered that the profits from 
securitization could be multiplied even further by dividing the mortgage 
backed securities into “tranches” – by splitting up these bundled mortgages 
into various pieces – and selling each of these pieces separately.39 For 
example, a bundle of mortgages might be split into ten different tranches, 
each representing the right to specific payments on the underlying set of 
mortgage loans.40 Accordingly, the first (highest-quality) tranche of the 
MBS might represent the right by the investor to be paid the first ten 
——————————————————————————————
34 Martin Neil Baily et al., The Origins of the Financial Crisis, in PAPER
3 FIXING FINANCE SERIES, BROOKINGS 1, 27 (2008).
35 Navid Vazier, Smoke and Mirrors: Predatory Lending and the 
Subprime Mortgage Loan Securitization Pyramid Scheme, 30 PACE L. REV.
41, 45-46. (2009).
36 Id at 46.
37 See Gretchen Morgenson, Inside the Countrywide Lending Spree, THE 
NEW YORK TIMES at A4 (Aug, 26 2007) (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/26/
business/yourmoney/26country.html).
38 Id.
39 See generally, FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, The Financial Crisis 
Inquiry Report, The CDO Machine (Jan. 2011), http://fcic-static.law.stanfo
rd.edu/cdn_media/fcic-reports/fcic_final_report_full.pdf.
40 Id. at 128.
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percent of payments received by the mortgage pool. For a MBS 
representing $100 million in bundled mortgages, an investor who 
purchased the first tranche of the MBS would obtain the right to the first
$10 million in payments received from borrowers. This tranche would be
considered an extremely “high quality” tranche because the only way the 
investor would lose money would be if over ninety percent of borrowers –
an unprecedented number – defaulted on their mortgages; otherwise, the 
first-tranche investor would be paid in full. Similarly, the second tranche of 
the MBS might represent the right to be paid the next ten percent of 
payments received by the pool. This too would be a high-quality tranche, 
since the investor would make money so long as twenty percent of
borrowers repaid or refinanced their loans.
Because these high-quality tranches had very little risk, they were 
sold by the originator at a lower premium but could still be sold at a 
profit.41 Moreover, because of the low default risk, rating agencies typically 
rated these high-quality tranches as AAA investments, and outside 
investors would rely on these ratings as a signal that the underlying 
investment was essentially risk-free; an attribute for which investors were 
willing to pay a premium.42 Subsequent lower-quality tranches of the MBS 
(often called “mezzanine” tranches) would involve higher risks but would 
simultaneously offer higher returns.43 These too could be sold by the 
originating bank and the securitizer at a profit, often obtaining an AA (or 
A) rating by the rating agencies despite the heightened risk of default.44
The lowest tranche of the MBS – e.g., the right to receive only the 
final ten percent of payments on the mortgages – would necessarily involve 
the highest default risk for the outside investor since a default by any 
borrower would directly impact returns for this MBS tranche. This lowest 
tranche – often called the “equity,” “residual,” or “first-loss” tranche –
——————————————————————————————
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.
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would normally be rated the lowest by the rating agencies and would offer 
the highest return as compensation for this increased risk.45
Banks and other financial institutions quickly discovered that they 
could successfully “bundle” and sell MBS tranches just as they 
successfully done so with residential mortgages.46 Moreover, these same 
institutions also discovered that by doing so, they could enhance their 
profits as well as distort public perception of risk. Institutions accordingly 
began selling collateralized debt obligations (“CDO”) that consisted of 
low-quality tranches from a variety of different mortgage-backed securities 
that the broker would originate and offload to investors.47 These CDO 
consisted of the riskiest portions of multiple mortgage-backed securities 
and accordingly entailed a substantial risk of default.48
Participants in the mortgage industry also discovered that they 
were able to hide these default risks, as well as further enhance their 
profits, by tranching CDO in the same way they had tranched the 
underlying MBS. For example, the first tranche of a CDO might 
correspond to the first ten percent of payments on the CDO, the second 
tranche the next ten percent, and so on. Financial institutions and brokers in 
the mortgage industry would then sell these CDO tranches to investors, just 
as they sold MBS tranches.49
Because CDO almost exclusively consisted of the lowest-quality 
tranches of the underlying MBSs – i.e., the portions of the MBS that were 
least likely to be repaid – the entire CDO entailed substantial default risk.
Through creative packaging and machinations, however, participants in the 
mortgage industry that created and sold these financial products were able 
to obtain high ratings (e.g., AAA) for many CDO tranches, thereby hiding 
this default risk from investors and maximizing the profits flowing to the 
securitizing entities.50
——————————————————————————————
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id.
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Finally, these same institutions and market participants also found 
a way to maximize their profits and hide the risk of even the lowest 
tranches of the CDO – i.e., the most at risk portion of a collection of the 
riskiest residential mortgages – by yet again repackaging these low-quality 
CDO tranches into another bundled product, the “CDO-squared,” which 
would again be sold to outside investors at a profit.51
The final product of this financial manipulation of residential 
mortgages, the typical practice throughout the relevant period, can be 
graphically displayed as follows:
——————————————————————————————
51 See Raghuram Rajan, A View of the Liquidity Crisis, CHICAGO 
BOOTH (Feb.2008), https://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/raghuram.rajan/reseac
h/papers/A%20view%20of%20the%20liquidity%20crisis.pdf.
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As the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and 
Economic Crisis in the United States concluded in The Financial Crisis 
Inquiry Report, “[s]ecuritization was designed to benefit lenders, 
investment bankers, and investors.  Lenders earned fees for originating and 
selling loans.  Investment banks earned fees for issuing mortgage-backed 
securities.... Purchasers of the safer tranches got a higher rate of return than 
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ultra-safe Treasury notes without much extra risk – at least in theory.”52
That last caveat proved to be exceptionally significant, because while 
lenders and investment bankers in the mortgage industry indeed profited 
from the resulting explosion in mortgage-backed securitization, these 
profits came at the direct expense of investors and resulted directly from 
the deliberate misconduct of these entities.
IV. THE DOMINANCE OF SECURITIZATION
Starting in 2000 (and in occasional years before then), a growing 
majority of residential mortgages originated in the United States were 
securitized, and the rate of securitization during this period increased 
virtually every year.53 By the late 2000s, the vast majority of residential 
mortgages were securitized rather than held by the originating lender, and 
this rate was exacerbated for originators whose business model relied upon 
securitization.54 Securitization was exceptionally dominant in the 
“subprime” portion of the mortgage industry, the particular portion of the 
industry most relevant to the mortgages at issue in the majority of criminal 
and civil prosecutions. Securitization levels peaked at roughly ninety 
percent of originated mortgages before the housing (and securitization) 
market crashed in 2008 and 2009.55
Further, during this period virtually every mortgage originator in 
the United States designated Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, 
Inc. (“MERS”) as the beneficial nominee on its mortgages in order to 
facilitate the easy transfer and securitization of the resulting mortgages, 
without the requirement that these transfers be recorded or publicly 
available.56 Typically, mortgages in this industry were securitized almost 
——————————————————————————————
52 THE CDO MACHINE, supra note 39.
53 See Fligstein & Roehrkasse, supra note 16 at 20.
54 See Adam J. Levitin & Tara Twomey, Mortgage Servicing, 28 YALE 
J. ON REG. 1, 11–13 (2011).
55 See Fligstein & Roehrkasse, supra note 16 at 20.
56 See Ellen Brown, Homeowners’ Rebellion: Could 62 Million Homes 
be Foreclosure-Proof?, YES! MAG., (Aug. 18, 2010), http://www.yesmagaz
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immediately after origination. The lenders were eager to obtain their profits 
from the brokers who bundled and securitized these mortgages, while the 
brokers were desperate for additional mortgages to bundle, and investors
were hungry to purchase new securitized packages.57
As a result of these innovations, the extent of securitization was 
massive.  For example, in 2006 alone, over $1.15 trillion in mortgage-
backed securities were issued.58 Moreover, the majority (seventy-one
percent) of the assets in these MBS products consisted of subprime or Alt-
A (“liar loan”) mortgages.59 Subprime and liar loan mortgages were; (a) 
typically made to lower-quality borrowers; (b) often made through “lite 
doc,” “stated income,” and/or stated (or no) asset mortgage programs; and,
(c) generally made at higher interest rates.  This portion of the mortgage 
industry consisted of the riskiest – yet most profitable – loans.60
Furthermore, those loans were almost invariably securitized, and because 
they offered the highest interest rates (and yet could be bundled or tranched 
with AAA ratings), were the ones most sought after by both lenders and 
other participants in the mortgage industry (e.g., brokers and investors).61
                                                                                                                          
ine.org/new-economy/homeowners-rebellion-could-62-million-homes-be-
foreclosure-proof.
57 See generally Miguel Segoviano Basurto, Bradley Jones, Peter Lindner 
& Johannes Blankenheim, Securitization: Lessons Learned and the Road 
Ahead 38 (Int’l. Monetary Fund Working Paper No. 13/255, Nov. 2013), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2381853 (choose to either download 
the paper or open pdf in browser).
58 See THE CDO MACHINE, supra note 39, at 102.
59 Id.
60 See generally Bill Black, Only Lying Lenders Made “Liar’s” 
Loans, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 28, 2011, 3:04 PM), http://www.businessinside
r.com/only-lying-lenders-made-liars-loans-2011-3.
61 See Michael LaCour-Little & Jing Yang, Taking the Lie Out of Liar Loans: 
The Effect of Reduced Documentation on the Performance and Pricing of Alt-A and 
Subprime Mortgages, 35 J. REAL EST. RES. 507, 508 (2013); Richard Greenberg & 
Chris Hansen, ‘If you had a pulse, we gave you a loan’, DATELINE NBC (Mar. 22, 
2009, 7:32:49 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/29827248/ns/dateline_nbc-
the_hansen_files_with_chris_hansen/t/if-you-had-pulse-we-gave-you-loan/#.WaNO
atMrK34.
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V. MORTGAGE FRAUD AND THE MARKET
Lenders of these types of loans during the relevant period did not 
generally make mortgages with any hope or expectation that the bank
would make money when, or if these loans were repaid.62 These entities 
instead originated these loans exclusively in the expectation that they 
would immediately bundle and sell them to outside investors, keeping fees 
and making profits for the banks regardless of whether the loans were 
actually repaid.  This was the routine and nearly uniform practice in the 
mortgage origination industry during the relevant period.  Because lenders 
promptly bundled and sold these mortgages, in pieces, they did not face 
any risk of loss and instead obtained substantial profits even when loans 
were entirely unpaid and foreclosed on. This persisted even when real 
estate prices declined.63
This was true even with respect to mortgages obtained through 
fraudulent means. Throughout the 2000s, mortgage fraud was rampant
across the United States.64 The details of any particular fraud scheme 
varied. Generally speaking, individuals would buy (or assist others in 
buying) residential properties by making false statements about their 
income, assets, intentions for the property, sale prices, or other facts in 
connection with the transactions.65 These individuals would then retain 
proceeds from the resulting residential mortgages.66 After the subsequent 
burst of the housing bubble, the properties would often go into foreclosure, 
——————————————————————————————
62 See Fligstein & Roehrkasse, supra note 16, at 18.
63 Id.
64 L. Randall Wray, The Mortgage Fraud Scandal Is the Biggest in 
Human History, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 14, 2010, 9:30 PM), http://www.busin
essinsider.com/mortgage-fraud-scandal-2010-10).
65 See Nicole Stowell, Carl Pacini, Martina Schmidt & Kathryn 
Keller, Mortgage Fraud: Schemes, Red Flags, and Responses, 6 J. OF 
FORENSIC & INVESTIGATIVE ACCT. 225, 229 (2014), http://web.nacva.com
/JFIA/Issues/JFIA-2014-2_7.pdf.
66 Id.
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in which case the lenders would repossess and then sell the mortgaged 
properties, often at a substantial loss.67
When a direct lender originates and holds a mortgage, it is the 
originating bank that stands to make money if the mortgage is fully repaid, 
or, lose money if it is not. By contrast, once a loan is securitized, the 
allocation of benefits and losses dramatically changes. Banks that originate 
and then securitize their loans make money merely by originating the loan, 
and do not stand to gain or lose money based on whether the mortgage is 
repaid. Instead, banks profit by collecting mortgage origination and other 
fees (including “junk” fees) associated with the mortgage, as well as 
additional proceeds based upon the “spread” between the stated interest 
rate on the mortgage and prevailing market interest rates.68 In other words, 
once the bank securitizes the loan, it no longer cares whether it is repaid.
Instead, its only concern is that the loans are generated, since the bank 
made its money through loan origination rather than repayment.69
The economic realities engendered by securitization were reflected 
in the loan products offered to borrowers by the banks. As the insatiable 
demand for securitized mortgages continued to grow, banks developed and 
originated high-interest “stated income/stated asset” mortgages that 
required no documentation and relied upon the borrower’s own (almost 
invariably misstated) representations about his income and assets to 
underwrite the loan. From 2000 to 2007, low-and-no-documentation 
mortgages more than quadrupled, from less than two percent to roughly 
nine percent of all outstanding loans. Similarly, alt-A originations increased 
from less than $20 billion in 2000 to more than $300 billion in 2005.  
——————————————————————————————
67 Id.
68 See Peter Eavis, With Rates Low, Banks Increase Mortgage 
Profit, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2012, at A5. Spread fees are profits paid to the 
mortgage originator when the interest rate on a mortgage is higher than 
market rates; e.g., when the interest rate on a loan is eight percent but the 
typical interest rate is only six percent. Id.
69 See Fligstein & Roehrkasse, supra note 16.
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Eighty percent of all subprime mortgages that were securitized in 2006 had 
limited or no documentation.70
The inherent risk of these loans did not deter the banks from 
making them. As the National Commission explained, with securitization, 
“[t]he mortgages would be packaged, sliced, repackaged, insured, and sold 
as incomprehensibly complicated debt securities to an assortment of hungry 
investors. Now even the worst loans could find a buyer. More loan sales 
meant higher profits for everyone in the chain.”71
Those buyers were, in turn, as desperate to buy mortgage-backed 
securities as the mortgage industry was to package and sell them. An MBS 
with a AAA rating would facially deliver high interest rates and was 
backed by a concrete asset – a residential property, typically in a rapidly-
appreciating market. Additionally, particular tranches of an MBS would 
often facially promise exceptionally high returns. Investors knew little 
about the underlying risks of these securities, but they knew how much 
they paid, and how hot the underlying real estate market was.  That was all 
that mattered. As long as the housing market continued to appreciate, 
everyone would make money.
VI. THE PROFITS AND LOSSES OF FRAUDULENT 
MORTGAGES
But, of course, all good things invariably come to an end. The 
housing bubble eventually collapsed. Borrowers stopped making their 
mortgage payments, and individuals and entities that held residential 
mortgages were often forced to foreclose on the property. When properties 
were eventually foreclosed upon, the sales price of the property was often a 
small fraction of the amount of the mortgage. Losses were huge. But not 
for the bank.
The bank that originated and funded the loan rarely held the 
foreclosed-upon mortgage. Rather, that mortgage had typically long ago 
been bundled and sold to outside investors. The originating lender rarely 
——————————————————————————————
70 See THE CDO MACHINE, supra note 39.
71 Id. at 7.
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lost money from even the most blatant mortgage fraud scheme. Instead, 
those mortgages generated hefty fees for the originating lender, and the fact 
that those loans later failed did not affect the lender, who had long ago 
departed the scene.
As a result of routine securitization, these entities benefitted, rather
than lost money, as a result of the pervasive securitization and the 
fraudulent mortgages with which they were associated. They sold these 
mortgages to others for a profit. They made money from origination and 
underwriting fees. They did not bear the risk of default, which they instead 
transferred to others through the securitization of these loans.  
When the banks securitized the underlying mortgages, they were 
bundled with a plethora of other mortgages and sold, in pieces, to others.  
The beneficial owners of these pieces were the ones who bore the risk of 
the resulting default upon the fraudulent mortgages, not the originating and 
investment banks. Moreover, when borrowers defaulted on these 
mortgages, typically, no particular person or entity – and, in any event 
certainly not the originating bank – owned the entirety of a single one of 
these loans. Rather, as the National Commission explained in its Financial 
Crisis Inquiry Report, by the time a single mortgage was foreclosed, “a 
mortgage on a home in south Florida might become parts of dozens of 
securities owned by hundreds of investors – or parts of bets being made by 
hundreds more.”72
Thus, the beneficial owners of the mortgage-backed securities 
within which the underlying mortgages were bundled were the only ones 
who could gain or lose money as a result of the repayment or failure to 
repay the loan. Despite this, courts in mortgage fraud cases have almost
uniformly entered criminal restitution orders that ignore this basic fact.
Instead, these orders portray the originating banks as the entities that have 
shouldered the financial consequences of the fraud. As a result, such orders
require individuals found guilty of mortgage fraud to pay those banks all 
losses from the underlying loans; typically, millions of dollars.73
——————————————————————————————
72 Id. at 8.
73 See, e.g., Robers v. U.S., 134 S. Ct. 1854, 1856-59 (2014) (affirming 
$220,000 restitution order); U.S. v. Beecroft, 825 F.3d 991, 995-97 (9th Cir. 
264 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL   Vol. 24.2
As has been stressed, the banks were not the ones who lost money.  
Rather, the ones who lost were the beneficial owners, typically consisting 
of mutual funds that had purchased an MBS, CDO, or MBS/CDO tranche, 
pension funds that had made a similar investment, hedge funds, 
governmental entities (e.g., municipalities), and on the rare occasion high 
net worth individuals looking for increased yields. Moreover, not only did 
these individuals and entities not own a particular mortgage or even a
particular piece of any mortgage; they almost always only owned a 
specified piece of a bundle of loans; i.e., the tranche associated with their 
purchase. Finally, even the entities that formally owned a particular tranche 
of a given MBS containing a fraudulent mortgage were still generally not 
the ones who gained or lost money from a default. Rather, it was the 
beneficial owners of those overlying securities – e.g., the individuals who 
owned shares in the mutual fund – who were the ones who actually stood to 
gain or lose from the return generated by the piece of an MBS or CDO 
tranche owned by the distributing entity.
For an allegedly fraudulent mortgage, then, the people who were 
actually at risk for losing money as a result of any subsequent default 
typically numbered in the tens or hundreds of thousands, or even millions.  
For example, a given mortgage might be securitized by a lender, bundled 
and sold in various MBS tranches, and a tiny slice of one of those particular 
tranches then purchased by a particular mutual fund (e.g., Vanguard), 
which then sells to investors a mutual fund of which this tiny slice of an 
MBS tranche is in turn a tiny portion of the fund. As a result, every 
individual investor who owned that particular Vanguard fund would be 
someone who might have lost money as a result of the default on the 
underlying mortgage. 
                                                                                                                          
2016) (affirming $2.2 million restitution order); U.S. v. Cross, 273 F.App’x. 557 
(7th Cir. 2008) (affirming $4.3 million restitution order); U.S. v. Powell, 
509 F.App’x. 958 (11th Cir. 2013) (affirming $843,000 restitution order). Courts 
do not appear to have considered the dominant presence of securitization in 
assessing the propriety of these restitution orders, nor does there appear to have 
been any evidence submitted in the underlying restitution hearings regarding this 
market practice.
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But even these individuals were likely not materially harmed by 
any particular mortgage fraud (or series of fraud).  Rather, to determine 
whether any person suffered any identifiable injury, one would first have to 
ascertain whether the level of defaults of other (totally unrelated) 
mortgages in the particular MBS rose to the level of the particular tranche 
of the MBS purchased by the mutual fund (or other entity).  If not, then the 
investor in that fund would not lose even a penny notwithstanding his or 
her beneficial ownership of a piece of the defaulted mortgage. And even if 
one could conclude that a particular tranche was, in fact, affected, one 
would then have to assess whether this tranche was insured, either by the 
government or private entities, as many MBS tranches were; if so, the 
mutual fund investor would again lose no money as a result of the default.
Finally, even if one could identify with certainty that an individual 
beneficial investor owned some tiny portion of a mutual fund that in turn 
owned a tiny piece of an uninsured tranche of an MBS containing a
particular fraudulent loan, and one was then somehow able to calculate 
with precision the degree of this individual investor’s exposure to any 
particular fraudulent mortgage, in truth, such an investor would not, in fact, 
have lost even a penny as a result the default. Any individual’s alleged 
“loss” from any such default would instead be, quite literally, a rounding 
error, and would not in fact affect at all the investor’s actual return.  Even 
in the worst of all possible worlds, an investor who has purchased, say, 
$100,000 worth of mutual fund shares in the $200 billion Vanguard 500 
fund, which in turn invested a fraction of its assets in a tiny piece of a
particular billion-dollar MBS, which in turn experienced even a million-
dollar default in one of those mortgages, would find that the net asset value 
of that fund would change not even a penny – or even a fraction of a 
fraction of a penny – as a result of this default.  It would not matter.  Even 
the $100,000 investor would not fear, nor would any such investor in fact 
typically incur, the loss of even a penny as a result of the default of a
particular fraudulently obtained mortgage, even if there was a default on 
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that mortgage and the underlying property sold for a mere fraction of that 
mortgage.74
But it gets worse. Even if these beneficial owners had incurred 
actual losses as a result of the default of a particular fraudulent mortgage, 
the restitution orders typically entered by courts do absolutely nothing to 
remedy these losses. These restitution orders do not compel the individual 
convicted of fraud to identify and reimburse the investors who actually 
(allegedly) incurred a loss from the underlying mortgage. Instead, these 
orders compel the defendant to pay these losses to the originating banks.
To reiterate: the banks made, rather than lost, money on these 
securitized mortgages. Providing money to these banks in restitution in no 
way remediates the harm to any beneficial owners of the fraudulent 
mortgages allegedly injured by the defaults. The originating lenders have 
no continuing relationship with the investors who (hypothetically) would 
——————————————————————————————
74 There are additional reasons not to worry about potential restitution 
to particular MBS investors as well. When individuals or entities 
purchased an MBS or CDO, these actors were neither participating as 
direct lenders nor funding an individual mortgage. Instead, by purchasing a 
selected “tranche” of a huge bundle of mortgages, rather than funding 
a particular loan, they were essentially placing a bet on the overall real 
estate market. Investors in an MBS tranche invariably thought that real 
estate prices would continue to rise, and hence that their tranche would be 
repaid either as borrowers refinanced or (if necessary) when the bank 
repossessed and sold the appreciated residence. These investors were not 
betting on an individual loan or mortgage. They were instead betting on the 
overall market. If the overall market went up, their bundle would go up, 
and they would make money. If the overall market went down, their bundle 
would go down, and they would lose money.
This is, in fact, why investors purchased residential-backed mortgage 
securities. Investors who thought that the real estate market was a bubble 
did not buy them. Those who thought that real estate would continue to 
appreciate did. Whether an individual mortgage was unsound, or unwise, or 
even fraudulent, was not the bet they made, and would not materially affect 
the value of their security. What mattered was simply the overall direction 
of the underlying real estate market.
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have been the ones financially harmed by the defaulted mortgages. Any 
restitution paid to these banks simply constitutes a windfall to them.
These restitution payments do not go to anyone who actually 
incurred any losses (even if they could be identified) as a result of the 
underlying fraudulent loans. Rather, these restitution payments simply 
become the assets of the relevant bank – a bank that, unlike the investor, 
actually gained, rather than lost, money as a result of the fraud.
The prevailing judicial restitution orders thus essentially rob Peter 
(the defendant) to pay Paul (the originating banks). And this robbery 
typically occurs when Peter’s already in prison, and Paul not only didn’t 
lose any money, but actually made money from – and often participated in 
– the underlying fraud. When the underlying mortgage has been 
securitized, the typical restitution order entered in favor of the originating 
bank is not only improper, but inequitable.
It is certainly true that lenders and others suffered mightily as a 
result of the collapse of the housing market and the burst of the real estate 
bubble. Banks failed, lenders went out of business, and billions of dollars in 
real estate valuations disappeared in the historical blink of an eye.  
Moreover, it is also true that some small fraction of those losses were 
infected with fraud, and resulted from mortgage loans made to individuals 
who were neither forthright nor fully truthful in their underlying mortgage 
applications.
But these businesses failed because the market collapsed, not 
because they lost money on the underlying loans. When the housing market 
crashed, investors were no longer confident in future real estate 
appreciation, and without such anticipated appreciation, no longer wanted 
to buy mortgage-backed securities. That is what destroyed the banks and 
lenders, not losses from any underlying frauds. Without demand from 
investors, there was no demand for securitization, and without 
securitization, lenders could not originate loans. The market dried up, and 
those lenders who participated in that market went bankrupt or disappeared.
That was not the fault of any individual who engaged in mortgage 
fraud. It was the result of the crash of the overall housing market, for 
reasons having nothing to do with fraud and everything to do with the 
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irrational exuberance of both purchasers of and investors in real estate.  
Lenders surely lost money, but, with the exception of the minority of direct 
make-and-hold originators, not from fraud.
VII. CONCLUSION
The dominant presence of mortgage securitization during the 
relevant period critically affects the propriety of civil and criminal 
restitution orders. Courts continue to enter such orders based upon a 
simplistic and outdated understanding of mortgage lending that does not 
reflect the dominant market in this century. The restitution orders entered 
by courts almost invariably fail to direct restitution payments to the actual 
losers, and instead improperly award restitution to lenders who made –
rather than lost – money from the underlying fraud.
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